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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
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a first degree felony, In violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 
(-| qqq | | ji f ' i l l ' ipp'il pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 u j i kj (Supp. 1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AUb 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
J Should evidence seized pursuant to m officei'^ 
objectively reasonable reli u I I I M li 
warrant be suppressed where a reviewing court later determines 
tint" f he nil mi i ^ i i^  « i i-^i; ! ! !i i V ~ i t h e 
constitutional authority to do so? 
Because the validity of the search warrant was unquestioned 
at trial, the trial court did not rule on MIL. issue. 
Consequently, this Court may resolve it as a matter of law, 
1 
without reference to any standard of review. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
References to constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules 
are unnecessary to the disposition of this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was convicted by a jury of one count of aggravated 
robbery, a first degree felony, arising from a late-night armed 
robbery of a Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant. The trial court 
sentenced him to five years to life in prison, to run 
consecutively with another sentence he was already serving. 
Defendant appealed the conviction on five grounds, all of which 
this Court rejected in an unpublished memorandum decision. State 
v. Thomas, No. 960170-CA (Utah App. Nov. 29, 1996)(unpublished). 
On certiorari, however, the Utah Supreme Court reversed this 
Court's determination that the issuance of a search warrant was 
not controlled by Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844 (Utah 
1994)(prohibiting court commissioners from performing core 
judicial functions). See State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299 (Utah 
1998) at addendum A. Because the Supreme Court held that issuing 
a search warrant is a core judicial function involving ultimate 
judicial power, it invalidated the warrant and remanded the case 
"for a determination as to whether the trial court's failure to 
suppress evidence obtained from the search constituted reversible 
error." Id. at 305. On the State's motion, this Court ordered 
2 
the question briefed. See Order at addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The following facts are relevant to the sole issue before 
the Court. After a Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant was robbed 
at gunpoint late one night, the responding police officers began 
searching an adjacent apartment complex. A woman approached one 
of the officers and asked if she was looking for a robber. When 
the officer confirmed that she was, the woman said, "He's in 
apartment #82," and described an individual who had been staying 
next door to her apartment for a few days (R. 360, 824-25, 834-
35) . 
Several uniformed officers met at apartment #82 (R. 815) . 
Looking through windows located on each side of the front door, 
they saw an individual in the lighted interior who matched the 
descriptions provided both by dispatch and by the next door 
neighbor (R. 816, 834) . One officer knocked loudly on the door 
with a flashlight (R. 816). Although the police announced 
themselves and the man inside knew they were there, he refused to 
answer the door or speak to them (R. 360 or addendum A, R. 817). 
At this juncture, the police forced entry into the 
apartment. As they did so, they heard someone say, "Don't come 
in here. I have a hostage and I'll kill her" (R. 360 or addendum 
3 
A). The officers immediately retreated.1 
Several officers maintained constant surveillance on the 
apartment throughout the night while two officers prepared a 
search warrant, took it to a court commissioner's home for her 
review and signature, and then returned to apartment #82 (R. 360, 
420, 840, 859, 871, 911). Just before 6 a.m., defendant emerged 
from the apartment and was taken into custody (R. 420, 841). The 
officers then executed the search warrant and discovered 
incriminating evidence in the apartment (R. 360, 420, 841-42, 
859) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Because the Supreme Court held that the issuance of the 
search warrant by the court commissioner was unconstitutional, 
the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant can only be admitted 
if an exception exists that would justify admittance of the 
evidence without a warrant. In this case, because the officers 
acted pursuant to the good faith exception to the warrant 
requirement, the evidence obtained in the search of the apartment 
should not be suppressed. 
1
 Defendant filed a motion in limine to prevent the state 
from introducing evidence about the hostage situation, arguing 
that its probative value with regard to the aggravated robbery 
was outweighed by its potentially prejudicial effect (R. 516-22). 
Although the court denied the motion, the State chose not to 
elicit testimony about the hostage situation at trial (R. 557). 
When the officers finally searched the apartment pursuant to the 
search warrant, they found no hostage inside (R. 420). 
4 
ARGUMENT 
ALTHOUGH THE SUPREME COURT HELD 
THAT COURT COMMISSIONERS CANNOT 
CONSTITUTIONALLY ISSUE SEARCH 
WARRANTS, THE EVIDENCE SEIZED 
PURSUANT TO AN OTHERWISE VALID 
WARRANT ISSUED PRIOR TO THE COURT'S 
DECISION SHOULD NOT BE SUPPRESSED 
BECAUSE THE POLICE ACTED IN GOOD 
FAITH AND SUPPRESSION OF THE 
EVIDENCE WOULD SERVE NO DETERRENT 
PURPOSE 
The sole question presented by this case is whether evidence 
seized pursuant to an otherwise valid search warrant should be 
suppressed where a reviewing court later determines that the 
issuing magistrate lacked the constitutional authority to issue 
the warrant. Under such circumstances, in order to sustain the 
search, the State must identify a valid basis other than the 
warrant on which to justify the search. See, e.g. State v. Gray, 
717 p.2d 1313, 1316 (Utah 1986)(reviewing court may affirm on any 
alternative ground). In this case, the good faith exception to 
the warrant requirement justifies the search and renders all 
evidence seized pursuant to it admissible. 
The law is well-settled that federal constitutional 
guarantees against unlawful search and seizure require exclusion 
of illegally obtained evidence in state criminal trials. Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Thus, if a search warrant - for which 
the law expresses a general preference - has not been obtained 
or is defective, some exception to the warrant requirement is 
5 
required to justify admittance of the evidence. In a case 
subsequent to Mapp v. Ohio, the United States Supreme Court 
carved out an exception to the general warrant requirement, 
holding that evidence obtained by police officers who act in good 
faith, reasonably and objectively relying on a search warrant 
issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, may be admitted even 
if the warrant is ultimately found to be unsupported by probable 
cause. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984). "It is 
only when the officer's reliance is ^wholly unwarranted' that 
good faith is absent." State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708, 711 (Utah 
App. 1993)(citations omitted). 
The good faith exception to the warrant requirement first 
articulated in Leon was subsequently extended in Illinois v. 
Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987). In Krull, the Court held that an 
exception to the exclusionary rule, similar to that articulated 
in Leon, "should be recognized when officers act in objectively 
reasonable reliance upon a statute . . . where the statute is 
ultimately found to violate the Fourth amendment." Krull, 480 
U.S. at 342. 
In both of these cases, the highest court of our nation 
upheld searches based on a police officer's objectively 
reasonable reliance on either a defective warrant or a defective 
statute. The rationale of these decisions is rooted in the 
primary purpose of the exclusionary rule: "to deter future 
6 
unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of 
the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures." 
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974). Because the 
circumstances presented by Leon and Krull did not implicate the 
future conduct of police officers, the Supreme Court determined 
that the exclusionary rule was not an appropriate remedy. 
The rationale of both Leon and Krull applies to the instant 
case. Here, the police reasonably relied on a search warrant 
issued pursuant to statute by a court commissioner acting as a 
magistrate. Ultimately, however, the Utah Supreme Court held 
that the commissioner's exercise of such authority under the 
statute was unconstitutional. In determining whether to apply 
the exclusionary rule to the evidence obtained pursuant to this 
defective warrant, this Court should examine whether applying the 
rule will advance its purpose of deterring police misconduct. 
See Krull, 480 U.S. at 353. 
Notably, in this case, no police misconduct was ever 
alleged. Indeed, the undisputed facts reflect that the police 
sought and secured a valid search warrant through all appropriate 
channels. Only later, on appeal, did the Utah Supreme Court 
determine that issuance of a search warrant was a "core judicial 
function'' and thus beyond the ambit of a court commissioner's 
authority. See Thomas, 961 P.2d at 302-04. Under such 
circumstances, then, suppression of the evidence would be wholly 
7 
unrelated to the conduct of the police and would serve no 
deterrent purpose at all. 
Not only is this case wholly lacking in police misconduct, 
but it is also marked by affirmative evidence of good faith. 
While the police initially made a brief warrantless entry into 
the apartment, they retreated quickly and put the apartment under 
surveillance. They then prepared a search warrant, took it to a 
court commissioner's home for authorization in the middle of the 
night, and returned to the apartment. After defendant emerged 
voluntarily from the apartment the next morning, the police 
executed the warrant. Thomas, 961 P.2d at 300. The facts thus 
demonstrate that the police, wholly cognizant of their 
responsibility to secure a well-founded warrant before searching 
the apartment, did all they reasonably could to ensure that the 
subsequent search of the apartment was lawful. 
Because the police acted in good faith and because 
suppression of the evidence would serve no deterrent purpose, the 
good faith exception to the warrant requirement provides an 
alternative ground for admitting the evidence found in the search 
of the apartment. Consequently, the trial court's failure to 
suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the defective warrant 
did not constitute reversible error. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm the trial 
8 
court's admission of the evidence seized in the apartment and 
affirm his conviction for aggravated robbery, a first degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1995). 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 2$L day o f December, 1998. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Richard Dee THOMAS, Defendant 
and Petitioner. 
No. 970049. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
May 22, 1998. 
Defendant was convicted in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, William B. 
Bohling, J., of aggravated robbery. The 
Court of Appeals affirmed and certiorari was 
granted. The Supreme Court, Russon, J., 
held that: (1) court commissioner could not 
constitutionally issue search warrant given 
that issuing search warrant was core judicial 
function involving ultimate judicial power, 
and (2) defendant inadequately briefed photo 
array issue. 
Reversed in part, affirmed in part and 
remanded. 
1. Certiorari e=>63.1 
On certiorari, Supreme Court reviews 
decision of Court of Appeals, not decision of 
trial court. 
2. Certiorari <3=>64(1) 
On certiorari, Supreme Court reviews 
Court of Appeals' decision for correctness 
and gives its conclusions of law no deference. 
3. Officers and Public Employees <3=*43 
Under doctrine of "de facto authority/' 
actions performed by those without actual 
authority are validated when they are per-
formed by one who, under the color of law, 
assumes to exercise official authority, is re-
puted to have it, and the community ac-
quiesces accordingly. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions. 
4. Court Commissioners <3>3 
Courts <2>100(1) 
Instant decision, holding that court com-
missioner does not have authority to issue 
THOMAS Utah 299 
299 (Utah 1998) 
search warrant, is prospective, and any prior 
search warrant issued by commissioner is 
mlid under de facto doctrine, except that 
present defendant would be given benefit of 
his victory, in making his constitutional chal-
lenge. Const. Art. 8, § 1; U.C.A.1953, 78-3-
31, 78-3-31(6)(a). 
5. Court Commissioners c=>3 
Holding in Ohms prohibiting court com-
missioners from performing core judicial 
functions did not deconstitutionalize court 
commissioners given that court commission-
ers are still able to perform many important 
functions in assistance to courts such as con-
ducting fact finding hearings, holding pretrial 
conferences, and making other recommenda-
tions to judges. Const. Art. 8, § 1; U.C.A. 
1953, 78-3-31. 
6. Court Commissioners <S=>3 
Issuance of search warrant is core judi-
cial function, which court commissioners lack 
authority to perform, though statute pur-
ports to give such authority to magistrates, 
which term includes commissioners, given 
that issuing search warrant could not be 
characterized as permissible functions of 
commissioner of either recommendation to 
judge or other action reviewable by judge, 
arid, when judge issues law enforcement or-
dsr to search and seize, judge simultaneously 
exercises power and authority to enforce 
such order, and once armed with issued war-
rant, law enforcement proceeds to search and 
ssize at will. Const. Art. 8, § 1; U.CA1953, 
77-1-3, 77-23-201, 78^3-31, 78-3-31(6)(a). 
7. Court Commissioners <£=>3 
Core judicial functions can 6e performed 
oiily by duly appointed judges, and not by 
court commissioners, and thus, only duly ap-
pointed judges can issue search warrants. 
Const Art. 8, § 1. 
8. Criminal Law <3=>1130(5) 
Due to defendant's lack of analysis, issue 
of whether trial court erred in denying his 
motion to suppress a positive eyewitness 
identification made from suspect photo array 
was inadequately briefed, and thus, Court of 
Appeals was justified in declining to address 
it. Rules App.Proc, Rule 24(a)(9). 
300 Utah 961 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
9. Criminal Law <3=»1130(5) 
Reviewing court will not address argu-
ments that are not adequately briefed. 
Rules App.Proc, Rule 24(a)(9). 
10, Criminal Law <5=>1130(5) 
While failure to cite to pertinent authori-
ty may not always render an issue inade-
quately briefed, it does so when the overall 
analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift 
the burden of research and argument to the 
reviewing court. Rules App.Proc, Rule 
24(a)(9). 
Jan Graham, Atty. Gen., Joanne C. Slotnik, 
Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
Bel-Ami Demontreux, Salt Lake City, for 
Defendant and Petitioner. 
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
RUSSON, Justice: 
We granted certiorari to review the Utah 
Court of Appeals' decision that our holding in 
Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844 (Utah 
1994) (prohibiting court commissioners from 
performing core judicial functions), does not 
apply to the issuance of a search warrant by 
a court commissioner. We are also asked to 
review the court of appeals' refusal to ad-
dress defendant's claim that the trial court 
erred in denying his motion to suppress a 
positive eyewitness identification made from 
a suspect photo array. The court of appeals* 
refusal was based upon inadequate briefing. 
State v. Thomas, No. 960170-CA, slip op. 
(Ct-App. November 29, 1996} (memorandum 
decision), cert, granted, 937 P.2d 136 (Utah 
1997). We reverse as to the applicability of 
Ohms and affirm as to the refusal to address 
the photo array issue. 
FACTS 
On the night of June 30, 1993, an armed 
robbery was committed at a fast food restau-
rant in Salt Lake County, Utah. At gun 
point, the assailant ordered the manager to 
put all the money into a bag and to accompa-
ny him to the parking lot. The manager was 
then released, and the assailant ran away. 
Shortly thereafter, police officers arrived on 
the scene and began their investigation of the 
robbery. As part of their investigation, they 
received a lead on a suspect who was report-
ed to be in a nearby apartment. The suspect 
was defendant Richard Dee Thomas. When 
the police arrived at the apartment, a con-
frontation ensued with Thomas. The officers 
forced entry into the apartment but retreat-
ed after Thomas threatened to kill a hos-
tage.1 Then, while some officers guarded the 
apartment, others went to obtain a search 
warrant. 
During the early morning of July 1, 1993, 
Third District Court Commissioner Frances 
M. Palacios issued a search warrant. After 
obtaining the search warrant, the police offi-
cers returned to the scene. Shortly thereaf-
ter, Thomas surrendered, and the apartment 
was searched. During the search, the police 
seized evidence linking Thomas to the crime. 
On July 2, 1993, the manager of the restau-
rant was shown a photo array of six men and 
identified Thomas as the man who committed 
the robbery. During interrogation and after 
Thomas waived his Miranda rights, Thomas 
confessed to committing the armed robbery. 
On July (), 1993, the State filed an informa-
tion against Thomas, charging him with ag-
gravated robbery, a first degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. S 7G-G-302. 
Thomas pleaded not guilty. 
Prior to trial, Thomas moved to suppress 
evidence obtained during the search. Thom-
as cited Salt Lake City v. Ohms and argued 
that the issuance of a search warrant consti-
tutes a fundamental court function and thus 
the search and seizure were unconstitutional 
in that the court commissioner who issued 
the search warrant lacked the authority to do 
so. This motion was denied. Thomas also 
moved to suppress eyewitness identification, 
arguing, inter alia, that the photo array of 
the six men was unduly suggestive. This 
motion wras also denied. On August 4, 1995, 
a jury convicted Thomas as charged. 
On appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, 
Thomas asserted, inter alia, that the trial 
court erred when it denied Thomas's motion 
1. It later turned out that there was no hostage. 
STATE v. 
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to suppress evidence and his motion to sup-
press eyewitness identification. In an un-
published memorandum decision, the court of 
appeals affirmed the trial court's rulings. 
Thomas then petitioned this court for certio-
rari review, and we granted the petition. 
ANALYSIS 
[1,2] "On certiorari, we review the deci-
sion of the court of appeals, not the decision 
of the trial court." State v. Harmon, 910 
P.2d 1196,1199 (Utah 1995). "We review the 
court of appeals' decision for correctness and 
give its conclusions of law no deference." 
Carrier v. Pro-Tech Restoration, 944 P.2d 
346, 350 (Utah 1997). 
I 
The first issue we address is whether the 
court of appeals erred when it held that Salt 
Lake City u. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844 (Utah 1994), 
did not apply to the issuance of a search 
warrant. Before the court of appeals, Thom-
as argued that court commissioners do not 
have the authority to issue search warrants. 
In a rather scant summary disposition of the 
issue, the court of appeals disagreed, simply 
stating: 
Thomas relies on Salt Lake City v. Ohms 
for the proposition that "the Utah Su-
preme Court, on August 18, 1994, held that 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-3-31 (1992\ 
that gave to Utah court commissioners 
their powers was unconstitutional." In ad^  
dition to having prospective application, 
Thomas's reading of Ohms is too broad 
and does not apply to the issuance of a 
search warrant. 
Thomas, slip op. at 1 (citation omitted). 
Although the court of appeals should have 
elaborated to make its ruling more clear, the 
essence of its holding appears to be that (1) 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-3 l(6)(a) (1992) stated; 
The court commissioner may accept pleas of 
guilty or no contest, impose sentence, and en^ 
ter final judgment in misdemeanor cases, 
Upon the informed consent of the defendant* 
the court commissioner may conduct a jury or 
nonjury misdemeanor trial in accordance with 
the law. Upon conviction, the commissioner 
may impose sentence and enter final judgment. 
The judgment entered by the commissioner 
THOMAS Utah 301 
299 (Utah 1998) 
Ohms had prospective application and there-
fore was inapplicable to Thomas's case be-
cause the search warrant pre-dated our ml-
ing in Ohms; (2) Thomas's assertion that 
court commissioners have no power was too 
broad a reading of Ohms since only the 
exercise of core judicial functions by court 
commissions was prohibited; and (3) Ohms 
did not apply because the issuance of a 
search warrant is not a core judicial function. 
We address these holdings in turn. 
[3] In Ohms, Ohms had been charged 
with giving false or misleading information to 
a police officer, a class C misdemeanor, in 
violation of Salt Lake City Ordinance 
§ 11.04.100. Ohms was tried, convicted, and 
sentenced by a court commissioner pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-31(6)(a) (1992).2 
Ohms appealed to this court, arguing that a 
court commissioner did not have the authori-
ty to enter a final judgment of conviction and 
impose sentence, as such was an unconstitu-
tional exercise of ultimate judicial power. 
We agreed and held that court commission-
ers cannot exercise a judge's ultimate judicial 
power or, in other words, cannot perform 
core judicial functions. In so holding, we 
found significant the fact that "[c]ourt com-
missioners are employees of the judiciary, 
not duly appointed judges," and that commis-
sioners are not subject to the "constitutional 
checks and balances" to which duly appointed 
judges are subject. Ohms, 881 P.2d at 851. 
We thus found section 78-3-31(6)(a) uncon-
stitutional because it delegated the core judi-
cial functions of entering final judgment and 
imposing sentence to a court commissioner. 
Under the doctrine of de facto authority,3 we 
validated the past actions of court commis-
sioners who had engaged in the unconstitu-
tional exercise of core judicial functions. 
shall be the final judgment of the court for all 
purposes, including appeal. 
3. Under this doctrine, actions performed by 
those without actual authority are validated 
when they are performed by one who, under the 
color of law. " 'assumes to exercise official au-
thority, is reputed to have it, and the community 
acquiesces accordingly.'" Ohms, 881 P.2d at 
854 (quoting Husse\ v. Smith, 99 U.S. 20, 24, 25 
L.Ed. 314(1878)). ' 
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A Prospective Application 
[4] Given only the court of appeals' con-
clusive statement, we assume that it agreed 
with the State's argument that Thomas was 
precluded from challenging commissioner ac-
tions because we limited Ohms to prospective 
application and the search warrant was is-
sued some fourteen months prior to Ohms. 
Indeed, a review of the record reveals that 
the search warrant was issued on July 1, 
1993, over thirteen months prior to the Ohms 
decision. However, while we stated in Ohms 
that "actions taken by commissioners in the 
past are not subject to challenge since court 
commissioners in those cases acted with de 
facto authority," we declined to apply the de 
facto doctrine to Ohms as he had "sustained 
the burden of attacking an unconstitutional 
statute." To hold otherwise and deprive an 
appellant of "the fruits of victory" would have 
the effect of "discouraging challenges to stat-
utes of questionable validity." Ohms, 881 
P.2d at 854-55. In the case before us, by 
arguing that the issuance of a search warrant 
is a core judicial function, Thomas, like 
Ohms, is attacking the constitutionality of a 
court commissioner's exercise of power. 
Thus, if Thomas sustains this burden, and we 
hold that he does, then the de facto doctrine 
would not apply to him for the same reasons 
it did not apply to Ohms. As in Ohms, our 
decision today is prospective, and any search 
warrants issued by court commissioners in 
the past are valid, as they were issued with 
de facto authority. Id 
B. The Power of Court Commissioners 
[5] Thomas argued before the court of 
appeals that our decision in Ohms held sec-
tion 78-3-31 unconstitutional and thus "de-
institutionalized court commissioners." 
The court of appeals dismissed this argument 
as going beyond what was actually held in 
Ohms. The court of appeals is correct. In 
Ohms, we clearly stated that section 78-3-31 
violated the Utah Constitution "to the extent 
that it purports to vest ultimate judicial pow-
er of courts of record in persons who have 
not been duly appointed as article VIII 
judges." Id at 855 (emphasis added). We 
also acknowledged that court commissioners 
"may perform many important functions in 
assistance to courts" such as conducting fact 
finding hearings, holding pretrial confer-
ences, and making other recommendations to 
judges. In fact, we specifically stated that 
"our decision in no way affects the authority 
and functions that court commissioners have 
enjoyed for over thirty years and will un-
doubtedly continue to enjoy in the future." 
Id at 851-52 n. 17. Nowhere in Ohms did we 
"deinstitutionalize" the court commissioner 
system. 
C. Issuance of a Search Warrant 
as a Core Judicial Function 
The court of appeals also held that Ohms 
did not apply because the issuance of a 
search warrant is not a core judicial function. 
This is a question of first impression. 
In Ohms, we stated that core judicial func-
tions include (1) "'the power to hear and 
determine controversies between adverse 
parties and questions in litigation/ " (2) " 'the 
authority to hear and determine justiciable 
controversies,'" (3) " 'the authority to enforce 
any valid judgment, decree or order,'" and 
(4) "all powers that are 'necessary to protect 
the fundamental integrity of the judicial 
branch/ " Id at 849 (citations omitted) (em-
phasis added). Core judicial functions do not 
include functions that are generally designed 
to "assist" courts, such as conducting fact 
finding hearings, holding pretrial confer-
ences, and making recommendations to 
judges. In these instances, the commission-
ers' actions are reviewable by a judge; thus, 
ultimate judicial power remains with the 
judge. Id at 851 n. 17. 
[6] Turning to the present case, it is well 
established that a search warrant is an order. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-201 (1995) (de-
fining search warrant as "an order issued by 
a magistrate in the name of the state and 
directed to a peace officer," describing the 
search and property to be seized); 1933 Re-
vised Statutes of Utah § 105-54-1 (stating 
that "[a] search warrant is an order in writ-
ing, in the name of the state, signed by a 
magistrate and directed to a peace officer, 
commanding him to search for personal prop-
erty and bring it before the magistrate"), 
quoted in Allen v. Holbrook 103 Utah 319, 
135 P.2d 242, 247-48 (1943); see also 79 
STATE v. 
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C.J.S. Searches and Seizures § 128 (1995). 
When a judge issues to law enforcement an 
order to search and seize, the judge simulta-
neously exercises the power and authority to 
enforce such an order, because once armed 
with an issued warrant, law enforcement pro-
ceeds to search and seize at will. Thus, 
because a search warrant is an order and the 
issuer possesses the authority to enforce the 
order, the issuance of a search warrant is a 
core judicial function, which commissioners 
lack the authority to perform. 
This holding is buttressed by the fact that 
the right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures embodied in the Utah 
and United States Constitutions4 is one of 
the most fundamental and cherished rights 
we possess. See, e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 
U.S. 753, 758, 105 S.Ct. 1611, 84 L.Ed.2d 662 
(1985) ("The Fourth Amendment protects 
. . . the right to be let alone—the most com-
prehensive of rights and the right most val-
ued by civilized men/ " (quoting Olmstead v. 
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478, 48 S.Ct. 
564, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting))); Camara v. Municipal Ct, 387 
U.S. 523, 528, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 
(1967) ("The Fourth Amendment thus gives 
concrete expression to a right of the people 
which is 'basic to a free society.'" (quoting 
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27, 69 S.Ct. 
1359, 93 L.Ed. 1782 (1949))); Harris v. Unit-
ed States, 331 U.S. 145, 150, 67 S.Ct. 1098, 91 
L.Ed. 1399 (1947) ("This Court has consis-
tently asserted that the rights of privacy and 
personal security protected by the Fourth 
Amendment *... are to be regarded as of the 
very essence of constitutional liberty; and 
that the guaranty of them is as important 
and as imperative as are the guaranties of 
the other fundamental rights of the individu-
al citizen '" (quoting Gouled v. United 
States, 255 U.S. 298, 304, 41 S.Ct. 261, 65 
L.Ed. 647 (1921))), overruled in part by Chi-
mel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 
2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969). Given the mag-
nitude of the right at risk when a search 
4. The Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, which is practically identical to ar-
ticle I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution, states: 
The nght of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
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warrant is issued, we have no difficulty in 
granting the issuance of a search warrant 
core function status. 
[7] The State proffers two arguments as 
to why court commissioners have the authori-
ty to issue search warrants. First, the State 
claims that commissioner authority to issue 
search warrants stems from their status as 
magistrates, who possess the clear statutory 
grant of power to issue search warrants. 
Section 77-1-3 does define a magistrate as "a 
justice or judge of a court of record or not of 
record or a commissioner of such a court 
appointed in accordance with Section 78-3-
31," and section 78-7-17.5(l)(c) does vest au-
thority in magistrates to "issue . . . warrants 
of search." However, as we have outlined 
above, Ohms held that under the Utah Con-
stitution core judicial functions can be per-
formed only by duly appointed judges. 
Thus, in accordance with our holding today, 
only duly appointed judges can issue search 
warrants. Court commissioners are not 
judges, and thus they cannot issue search 
warrants. Any attempt by the legislature to 
statutorily confer the power to issue search 
warrants upon court commissioners would be 
null and void as a violation of the Utah 
Constitution. We do not hold the above-
stated statutes unconstitutional, however, be-
cause section 78-7-17.5(1) clearly grants 
magistrates the power to issue search war-
rants, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by 
law." 
Second, the State argues that the issuance 
of a search warrant is not a core judicial 
function involving the exercise of ultimate 
judicial power but rather involves a nonadju-
dicative preliminary matter that simply as-
sists the court in moving the case along. 
Certainly, many actions are capable of "as-
sisting" courts, including the performance of 
core judicial functions. Thus, determining 
whether a particular action assists a court 
does not end the inquiry. As we have noted, 
functions that commissioners can constitu-
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things 
to be seized. 
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tionally perform are those that constitute 
recommendations or other functions that are 
reviewable by a judge. Issuing a search 
warrant cannot be characterized as either a 
recommendation or an action that is reviewa-
ble by a judge. The commissioner in this 
case did not recommend to the judge that the 
warrant be issued but rather issued it her-
self. Similarly, the decision to issue was not 
subject to review by a judge with the possi-
bility of disallowing the search. Rather, the 
order to search and seize was issued and 
then executed immediately thereafter. Fur-
thermore, while the issuance of a search 
warrant is a "preliminary" decision when 
looking at a criminal prosecution as a whole, 
it is a final decision as to whether a search 
will occur. Thus, while issuing a search war-
rant does not rise to the level of finality as 
entering judgment and imposing sentence, as 
was disallowed in Ohms, it is sufficiently final 
to establish it as a core judicial function. We 
thus hold that because the issuance of a 
search warrant is a core judicial function, 
which cannot be performed by a court com-
missioner, the court of appeals erred when it 
held that Ohms did not apply. 
Thomas also objects to a court commission-
er presiding over his first appearance. He 
argues that, similar to issuing a search war-
rant, presiding over a first appearance is a 
core judicial function that commissioners lack 
the authority to perform. However, Thomas 
fails in his brief to identify or describe this 
hearing or discuss what the commissioner's 
actions were and how these actions constitut-
ed the exercise of core judicial functions. 
Thomas cited only to the Third Circuit 
Court's docket sheet stating that a first ap-
pearance took place. A review of the record 
reveals no further evidence of the first ap-
pearance. It does show, however, that 
Thomas's preliminary hearing was held be-
fore Circuit Court Judge Phillip K. Palmer 
and that it was he who bound Thomas over 
for trial in Third District Court. Rule 
24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Pro-
cedure requires an appellant's argument to 
contain the "reasons of the appellant with 
respect to the issues presented . . . with cita-
tions to the . . . parts of the record relied 
on." Thomas has failed to comply with these 
requirements. His brief is totally inade-
quate, and therefore, we decline to address 
this issue. 
II 
[8] The second issue we address is 
whether the court of appeals erred when it 
declined to address Thomas's claim that the 
trial court erred in denying his motion to 
suppress a positive eyewitness identification 
made from a suspect photo array because 
Thomas failed to adequately brief the issue. 
The court of appeals stated: 
Thomas ignores several decisions address-
ing proper challenges to photo array cases. 
See State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1111 
(Utah 1994); State v. Thamer, 777 P.2d 
432, 435 (Utah 1989). Because Thomas 
fails to adequately brief this argument, it is 
without merit and we decline to address it. 
See Utah R.App. P. 24(a)(9) (requiring "ci-
tations to the authorities [and] statutes . . . 
relied on"). 
Thomas, slip op. at 3. 
A review of the record reveals that Thom-
as devoted four pages of his brief before the 
court of appeals to his photo array argument. 
However, almost three of these pages con-
sisted of direct quotes from the trial tran-
script. On the basis of the trial testimony, 
Thomas then asserted that the photo array 
was overly suggestive. His only reference to 
any legal authority is contained in the bald 
assertions that the 
identification also taints any other identifi-
cation of Mr. Thomas in violation of due 
process under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Consti-
tution. The overly suggestive photo array 
also violates Art. I, § 7 of the Utah State 
Constitution (Due process); see also State 
v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991). 
These statements concluded his argument. 
[9] It is well established that a reviewing 
court will not address arguments that are 
not adequately briefed. State v. Herrera, 
895 P.2d 359, 368 n. 5 (Utah 1995) (refusing 
to address defendant's state due process ar-
gument where argument entailed only super-
ficial statement concerning Utah's unique 
history and reference to another part of de-
VALCARCE v. 
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fendant's brief); State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 
960, 966 (Utah 1989) (declining to rule on 
issue where defendant's brief "wholly 
lack[ed] legal analysis and authority to sup-
port his argument"); State v. Amicone, 689 
P.2d 1341,1344 (Utah 1984) (declining to rule 
on separation of powers argument where ar-
gument was not supported by any legal anal-
ysis or authority). 
In deciding whether an argument has been 
adequately briefed, we look to the standard 
set forth in rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. This rule states that 
the argument in the appellant's brief "shall 
contain the contentions and reasons of the 
appellant with respect to the issues present-
ed . . . with citations to the authorities, stat-
utes and parts of the record relied on." Im-
plicitly, rule 24(a)(9) requires not just bald 
citation to authority but development of that 
authority and reasoned analysis based on 
that authority. We have previously stated 
that this court is not " 'a depository in which 
the appealing party may dump the burden of 
argument and research.*" State v. Bishop, 
753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988) (quoting Wil-
liamson v. OpsahL, 92 Ill.App.3d 1087, 48 
IU.Dec. 510, 511, 416 N.E.2d 783, 784 (1981)). 
FITZGERALD 
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CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, we reverse the court of ap-
peals' holding that Salt Lake City v. Ohms 
does not apply to the issuance of a search 
warrant. Issuing a search warrant is a core 
judicial function involving ultimate judicial 
power. We remand the case to the court of 
appeals for a determination as to whether the 
trial court's failure to suppress evidence ob-
tained from the search constituted reversible 
error. We further affirm the court of ap-
peals' holding that Thomas inadequately 
briefed the photo array issue. 
HOWE, C.J., DURHAM, Associate C.J., 
and STEWART and ZIMMERMAN, J J., 
concur in Justice RUSSON's opinion. 
[O I«YNUM8!*SYSTIM> 
[10] In his brief to the court of appeals, 
Thomas did cite to the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the United States Constitu-
tion, to article I, section 7 of the Utah Consti-
tution, and to the case of State v. Ramirez. 
However, this is all he did. Analysis of what 
this authority requires and of how the facts 
of Thomas's case satisfy these requirements 
was wholly lacking. The court of appeals 
also noted, "Thomas ignores several decisions 
addressing proper challenges to photo array 
cases." Thomas, slip op. at 3. While failure 
to cite to pertinent authority may not always 
render an issue inadequately briefed, it does 
so when the overall analysis of the issue is so 
lacking as to shift the burden of research and 
argument to the reviewing court. Because of 
Thomas's lack of analysis, the photo array 
issue was inadequately briefed and the court 
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State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Richard Dee Thomas, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Julia D'Alesandro 
Clerk of the Court 
ORDER 
Case No. 961170-CA 
This matter is before the court upon appellee's request 
filed September 29, 1998, that the court establish a briefing 
schedule. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that each party shall file a brief, of 
not more than twenty-five (25) pages in length, addressing only 
the issue of whether the trial court's failure to suppress 
evidence obtained from the search of the apartment constituted 
reversible error. Appellant's brief shall be served and filed no 
later than thirty (30) days from the date of this order, with 
appellee's brief served and filed within thirty (30) days after 
service of appellant's brief. 
Dated this 9 tL day of October, 1998 
FOR THE COURT: 
